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F. No. 19389. In Bank. Oct. 30, 
INDUS'rRIAL INDEMNI'I'Y COMPANY Corporation) 
GOJ_,DEN STATB COMPANY, 
, et Defendants; G. W. 
DRAY AGE & RIGGING INC. 
Defendants and ; '!'HE 
ROBITIHT L. JOHNSON CORPORATION (a Corpora-
, Intervener and 
Insurance--Reciprocal Insurers--Transfers.-In an action for 
relief regarding the rights of nonconsenting sub-
scribers of a reciprocal insurance exchange under an agreement 
its business to plaintiff indemnity company, 
from the placement of policies by former sub-
scribers of the exchange with the company were not part of the 
business or assets of the exchange, and it was not unfair and in-
equitable to allow the company to keep the claimed profits, 
where expert witnesses showed that, in evaluating the business 
a.nd assets of an established insurance business, the future 
profits or prospective earnings are never taken into account, 
and where insurance brokers testified that the transfer agree-
ment had no influence on their decisions to place business with 
the company, that they knew the company and exchange had 
had the same management and when the exchange went out of 
business they placed their business with the company for that 
reason, but they also stated that they would not have done so 
if they cou1d have obtained a better "deal" elsewhere, and that 
some business was placed with the company at the client's re-
quest because of ownership interest in the company. 
!d.-Reciprocal Insurers Transfers.-In an action for declara-
tory relief regarding the rights of nonconsenting subscribers of 
a reciprocal insurance exchange under an agreement transfer-
ring its business to plaintiff indemnity company, findings that a 
partnership acting as attorney for the exchange was entitled to 
receive a percentage of premiums for its services as attorney-
in-fact, that the subscribers had no right to these fees, that 
the company agreed to perform the obligations for the attorney 
and was assigned the right to receive the unpaid attorney fees, 
and that these fees constituted no part of the business or assets 
of the exchange, were supported by evidence of an underwrit-
ers agreement under which the attorney-in-fact had full power 
[1) See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 99 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: Insurance, § 10.5; [4] Damages, 
§ 34; Parties, § 25. 
and to enforce 
same way as an individual 
C.2d 
agreement which thnt the company would reinsure 
all policies and all obligations of the 
exchange und(lr the terms of the policies, each of which in-
corporated the underwriters' agreement, and by a document 
executed bPtween the attorney and the company whereby the 
Mvrnr•nn'" assumed the obligations of the attorney and the attor-
ney its rights to the management fees. 
[3] Id.-·Reciprocal Insurers-Transfers.-In an action for declara-
tory relief regarding the of nonconsenting subscribers 
of a reciprocal insurance under an agreement trans-
ferring its business to plaintiff indemnity company, the trial 
court did not err in holding that a special surplus fund was not 
a part of the business or assets of the exchange, where it ap-
peared from an underwriters' agreement that a partnership 
acting as attorney for the exchange was entitled to the fund "if 
Exchange discontinues business" as compensation for winding 
up the affairs and liquidation and that the exchange had been 
discontinued; and a further finding that this fund was assigned 
to the company as compensation for work performed in con-
nection with the liquidation of the exchange, less the portion 
required to reimburse the attorney for future costs of liquida-
tion, and that the subscribers had no right or claim to this 
surplus since it was not a part of the exchange's business or 
assets, was proper and did not result in the company being 
unjustly or unfairly enriched, where the benefits it thereby 
received did not arise as a consequence of the transfer agree-
ment, but as a result of the attorney's determination not to 
issue any new policies. 
[4] Damages-Interest.-In an equitable proceeding, the matter 
of awarding or withholding interest is within the sound dis-
cretion of the court, and interest should be awarded only when 
such an award is fair and equitable under the facts of 
the case; in an action for declaratory relief regarding the 
rights of nonconsenting subscribers of a reciprocal insurance 
exchange under an agreement transferring its business to 
plaintiff indemnity company, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow interest on an award to defend-
ants where it found that the company had not acted in bad 
faith. 
[5] Parties-Intervention-Stat.us of Intervener.-In a stockhold-
ers' derivative action interveners are but volunteers in the 
main original cause, and their counsel may not participate in 
the presentation of the main case save as counsel for the main 
stoekholders may consent or the court may permit; the court 
is not bound to permit the intervention of others of the same 
class if their interests are properly protected. 
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APPEALS from a of the Superior Court of the 
and County of San Francisco. Albert C. Wollenberg, 
Affirmed. 
Action for the rights of non-
subscribers insurance exchange 
under an agreement business to plaintiff in-
company, in which a cross-complaint for restitution 
was Judgment restitution to defendants for 
amount less than that affirmed. 
Kearney & Fargo, Frank B. Belcher, Kenny & 
Robert W. Kenny, Jerome Politzer, Morris E. Cohn 
and Hyman & Hyman for Defendants and Appellants. 
Park Chamberlain and Earl C. Berger for Intervener and 
Appellant. 
Marrin, Johnson & Bridges and Edward J. Ruff for 
Respondents. 
McCOMB, J .-Industrial Indemnity Exchange (hereinafter 
referred to as Exchange) was a reciprocal insurance organ-
ization handling workmen's compensation insurance. Indus-
trial Indemnity Company (hereinafter referred to as Com-
also handled workmen's compensation insurance. There 
was considerable interrelation between Exchange and Com-
but no competition. Industrial Underwriters (herein-
referred to as Attorney) was the managing entity of 
Exchange and Company. 
In a reciprocal exchange the participants, called under-
writers or subscribers, exchange insurance contracts for their 
mutual protection through the medium of an attorney-in-fact, 
who also sets rates, settles losses, compromises claims and 
cancels contracts. Attorney acted in this capacity for Ex-
change under an agreement known as Underwriters Agree-
ment. In return for its services it received a percentage of 
the premiums deposited by the subscribers and was required 
to furnish offices and personnel for Exchange's operations out 
of this percentage. 
Attorney, a partnership with substantially the same stock 
ownership as Company, also furnished offices and personnel 
for the latter. The Insurance Commissioner objected to the 
411 c.2d-8 
elimination 
bination of their activities. 
An agreement was entered into h<>l·w''"" ~onon"n" and Ex-
the would be 
would service 
subscribers an amount 
as determined by such run-out. 
Consents were obtained from 98 per cent of the subscribers 
of Exchange to this agreement. 
Subsequently an action for declaratory 
relief regarding the rights of the nonconsenting subscribers. 
were filed sevzora.l sets of these subscribers. 
After trial, was rendered in favor of Company, and 
the cross-complaints were ordered. dismissed. 
'l'\VO separate sets of defendants (1) G. vV. Thomas 
Drayage and Rigging Company, Inc .. W. H. BaHinger and 
Son, a corporation, and .Minna M. Ballinger (hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant Thomas Drayage and Rigging Com-
pany), and (2) Robert L. Johnson Corporation, for itself 
and as representative of all similarly situated co-owner sub-
scribers of Exc.hangc (hereinafter referred to as defendant 
,Johnson Corporation). 
On appeal it was held that the contract between Company 
and Exchange was m(~gal and void in violation of section 
llOl of the Insurance Code. (Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden 
State Co., 117 Cal.App.2c1 519 [256 P.2d 677].) 'fhe appellate 
court (1) reversc~d the judgment in favor of Company and 
remanded the caRe to the trial court with directions to deny 
all declaratory relief to plaintiffs, and (2) stated that "in 
the cross-actions, relief will be granted rto appellants] only 
with respect to the consequences of the illegality of the trans-
fer and assumption . . . . " (See p. 540.) It then 
directed the trial court to defendants "such relief as 
the court will deem fit to enable them to recover in their repre-
sentative capacity for subscribers the bus1:ness and assets ob-
tained by Company in consequence the agreement herein 
held to be -invalid . ... " pp. 540-541.) (Italics added.) 
After the reversal of the trjal court's judgment defendant 
Johnson Corporation filed a for judgment and decree 
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of the effect of the 
court's remittitur. Defendant Thomas Drayage and Rigging 
moved to strike this petition upon the ground that 
Johnson was a mere ''intervenor'' and as such 
not entitled to act on terms of with the other defend-
ants. 'rhis motion was the There-
after was entered in favor of the defendants in the 
son 
this both defendant 
and defendant John-
APPEAL OF DEFENDANT 'rHOMAS DRAYAGE AND RIGGING 
COMPANY 
In view of the former decision on appeal the trial court was 
limited to a determination of this issue: What bttsiness and 
assets were obtained by Company in conseq1tence of the" Trans-
and Assumption Agreement"? 
There can be no question that the "agreement" held to be 
invalid referred to the Transfer and Assumption Agreement 
that was the basis of the litigation. An examination of the 
record discloses that the following findings of fact are sus-
tained by substantial evidence: 
"IV. Coincident with the issuance to Underwriters of 
the Certificate of Authority to act in liquidation of the Ex-
change, and on November 4, 1953, Company transferred to 
Underwriters and Underwriters accepted on behalf of Ex-
change and its subscribers, and with the approval of the Ad-
visory Committee of Exchange, all of the business, property 
and assets of Exchange remaining in its hands after satisfac-
tion of liabilities of the Exchange and which had been received 
by Company in consequence of the Transfer and Assumption 
Agreement. Underwriters has thereafter at all times con-
tinued in possession of and presently holds such business. 
property and assets for distribution to the subscribers of the 
Exchange in liquidation of its business and affairs. As of 
March 1954, the net worth, representing the excess of as-
sets over liabil#,ies, inclttding reserves for logses incttrrcd and 
to be inctLrrcd, of the bu.siness. property and assets so trans-
ferred, exclttsive of the Surpl11s Acconnt, wa,s $!323,-
300.39. (Italics added.) 
"V. The and assets of Exchange re-
ceived by in consequence of the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement and thereafter transferred to Under-
writers as found herein, included all assets and liabilities of 
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lill,Cl:llancge as reflected on the balance sheet of December 31, 
1948, and which thereafter arose or accrued and all policies 
of insurance in force on the books of the Exchange as of 
December 31, 1948, and the entire thereon includ-
ing the development of claims and All of the busi-
ness, property and assets of JCJAc1uux~ 
acter received by Company from at any time, aud 
all value attributable thereto have been returned by Company 
to Underwriters and are included within the net worth as set 
forth in Paragraph IV of these Findings. The business, 
property and assets of Exchange do not include any policies 
written by the Company after December 31, 1948, for or on 
behalf of any former subscribers of Exchange and the net 
worth as set forth in Paragraph IV of the findings does not 
reflect any value with regard to such policies and no account-
ing of any profits made by Company on such policies is any 
part of these findings. 
"VI. Under the provisions of the Transfer and Assump-
tion Agreement, Company, with regard to policies of insurance 
in force in the Exchange as of December 31, 1948, took over 
for its own account that portion of the 1948 policy year oc-
curring after December 31, 1948, and under the provisions 
of the Transfer and Assumption Agreement no adjustment 
was to be made to the net worth of the Exchange payable 
to the subscribers with regard to tbis portion of the experience 
on those policies. That portion of the 1948 policy year taken 
over by Company for its own account developed to be un-
profitable. This loss amounted to $156,600.53. All policies 
of insurance in force with Exchange as of December 31, 1948 
and the entire experience on those policies, including the ex-
perience on the entire 1948 policy year, and the entire ex-
perience on policies previously issued by Exchange and ex-
pired on December 31, 1948, are a part of the business and 
assets of the Exchange and because of the invalidity of the 
Transfer and Assumption Agreement are for the account of 
the Exchange. This entire experience on policies of insur-
ance in force with Exchange as of December 31. 1948, as 
well as the entire experience on policies previously issued by 
Exchange and expired on Decemb?r 31. 1948, is reflected in 
the amount of net worth as set forth in Paragraph IV of these 
Findings. 
"VII. All policies of insuranee at any time issued by the 
Exchange, including those in force as of December 31, 1948, 
were issued subject and pursuant to the terms and provisions 
STATE Co. 261 
an Underwriters' executed by each of the sub-
~;cribers. Gnder the terms of such Underwriters' Agreement, 
true copy of which has been received in evidence as De-
fGnda uts' Exhibit No. 6, Underwriters was appointed as At-
'orney-in-Fact and was entitled to receive as its fee 25 per 
1 '~nt of all premium deposits received and 5 per 
of all credited to each subscriber. The subscribers 
any of them did not at any time have any right to any por-
1ion of il1ese fees to be to Underwriters and such fees 
were at all times the property of Underwriters or its assignee. 
The Underwriters' Agreements have at all times been in full 
force and effect with regard to all policies of insurance issued 
or on behalf of Exchange. 
"VIII. By written agreement dated January 2, 1949, a 
true copy of which has been received in evidence as Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 3, following the execution of the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement, Company agreed to perform for 
Underwriters after January 1, 1949, all of Underwriters' 
obligations relating to policies of insurance at any time issued 
Exchange and Underwriters transferred to Company its 
rights to receive fees under the Underwriters' Agreement and 
as yet unpaid. Company performed all services required by 
it to be performed under such agreement. Following the de-
cision of the District Court of Appeal, Company and Under-
writers without notice to the defendants and cross-complain-
ants G. W. 'rhomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc., 
W. R. Ballinger & Son. a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger, 
terminated and cancelled the agreement of January 2, 1949, 
and without notice to the defendants and cross-complainants 
G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R. 
Ballinger & Son, a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger, 
executed a written agreement dated November 15, 1953, a true 
copy of which has been received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit No. 4, acknowledging paymeut to Company of fees pay-
able to Underwriters under said Underwriters Agreements 
and releasing Company of all claims by Underwriters to any 
fees theretofore collected by Company. All of such Attorney-
in-Fact's fees have been properly taken into account in com-
puting the net worth referred to in Paragraph IV of these 
findings and the subscribers have no right to any portion of 
such fees paid to or received, directly or indirectly, by Com-
pany or Underwriters and they do not constitute any part of 
the business, property or assets of Exchange to which the sub-
scribers are entitled. 
insurance agents or brokers who were free to 
business with such insurance carriers as they chose. 
C.2d 
cision as to the of any of workmen's com-
into 
and 
an insurance any one 
year did not mean that it would be 
in a year. 
"XIV. All 
after December 31, persons, firms or cor-
porations who had of Exchange 
were voluntarily as new items of 
business by insurance agents or brokers who were free to 
place such policies with such insurauee carrier as they chose. 
The decision as to the placement of such policies of workmen's 
compensation insurance is made each year by the insurance 
agent or broker as a new item of business, taking into con-
sideration all elements of coverage, cost, management and 
other relevant matters. 'l'he placement of a policy of insur-
ance with Company in any one year does not mean that it 
will be placed with Company in any succeeding year. In view 
of these circumstances surrounding the placement of business, 
it cannot be determined and there is no evidence that any of 
these policies will be placed with the Company in the future. 
None of these pol.icies was placed with Company by reason 
of or as a consequence of activities of Company being per-
formed under, or arisi11.g as a consequence of, the Transfer 
and Ass1lmption Agreement or because Company was regarded 
in any sense as being the snccessor of Exchange. All policies 
placed with Company were so placed because the coverage, 
cost and service afforded by management of Company was 
attractive to the policyholder and insurance agent or broker. 
(Italics added.) 
"XVIII. Company did not use, succeed to or receive for 
its own account new or different information concerning past 
or prospective policyholders or succeed to or receive any new 
or different management, name, insignia, goodwill or agency 
plant from Exchange as a consequence of the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement, nor did it at any time or in any 
manner receive any management, name, insignia, goodwill or 
263 
or 
subscribers of 
In connection with its business of insurance man-
Underwriters out of its own funds and 
an and 
of this 
"XXII. No of insurance are any of the bmd-
ness, or assets of those policies of 
insurance which had beel'i and were in force on 
the books of Exchange and no value is to be given to nor 
allowance made for any prospective business not in force on 
the books of Exchange on December 31, in determining 
the business, property or assets of Exchange. 
"XXVI. It is not true that the compensation paid or to 
be to or for the account of Attorney-in-Fact under the 
provisions of the Underwriters' Agreements is in any amount 
or for any period any part of the business, property or assets 
of the Exchange or the subscribers to the Exchange. 
"XXX. It is not true that any policies of insurance writ-
ten or to be written by Industrial Indemnity Company on or 
after January 1, 1949, or at any time for, with, or on behalf 
of persons, firms or corporations who were former subscribers 
of the Exchange or any other persons, firms or corporations, 
or the profits therefrom or net earnings or any earnings there-
on are or were any part of the business, property or assets of 
the Exchange or the subscribers of the Exchange or are any 
part of the business, property or assets of Exchange obtained 
by Company in consequence of the Transfer and Assumption 
Agreement. 
"XXXI. It is not true that there are any other assets not 
yet discovered or identified which constitute business, property 
or assets of the Exchange or which were the business, prop-
erty or assets of Exchange on December 31, 1948, or at any 
other time and which are not reflected in the net worth as 
referred to in Paragraph IV of these and it is true 
that all of the business, property and assets of the Exchange 
and all of the business, property and assets of Exchange 
received by Company in consequence of the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement are now in the possession of the Ex-
change, to the control of the Committee of 
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the Exchange, Underwriters and the Insurance Commissioner 
of the State of California and are reflected in the net worth 
as set forth in Paragraph IV of these findings." 
It logically follows that since the trial court's findings are 
supported by evidence and covered the issues the appellate 
court had ordered retried, the judgment in the principal 
amount should be affirmed. 
Defendant Thomas Drayage and Company urges 
the following contentions, which are without merit: 
[1] First: That the profits arising from the placement of 
policies by former Exchange subscribers with Company were 
part of the business or assets of Exchange. 
The trial court found that none of the profits arising from 
the placement of policies by former Exchange subscribers 
with Company was part of the business or assets of Exchange. 
(See Findings IV, V, XIII, XIV, XXII and XXX, supra.) 
Defendant does not attack these findings on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence, but on the ground that it is 
unfair and inequitable to allow Company to keep the claimed 
profits. This contention is unsound. The testimony of two 
expert witnesses showed that in evaluating the business and 
assets of an established insurance business, future profits or 
prospective earnings are never taken into account. In other 
words, there is no value placed upon the possibility of future 
earnings. 
The reason is succinctly stated by one witness, Mr. Best, as 
follows: "Now, in the writing of that type of business [work-
men's compensation] there is never any right of a policyholder 
to demand that his policy be renewed, there is never any right 
on the part of the company to demand that that policyholder 
renew his policy with that company. The business, in fact, is 
controlled first of all by the policyholder himself. He decides 
where he wants to put it. Then he hires a broker or agent to 
look after it, and he has a considerable say as to just where 
that business is to go, that is to what carrier company or re-
ciprocal or what have you. Then finally the company gets the 
business. It happens that in that particular field there is a 
tremendous shifting from company to company as these an-
nual policies expire. I had occasion to observe that particular 
matter, which is very striking. There is great competition 
for those big policies, and company A may have it this year 
and company B gets it next year and company C gets it the 
third year and so forth, so it is a transitory sort of business, 
and not only that, but actually in such a business every year's 
265 
ac-
It 
so, 
and it well understood that whoever carries the risk is 
entitled to the and to any that results because 
carries the risk and must bear the if there is a loss, 
has been considered that the business that is 
the books at the valuation is 
be made can be future busi-
ness itself is too uncertain. 
the of witnesses Hullin, 
all of whom are brokers of work-
men's compensation the questioned find-
They testified that are reviewed annually, about 
two months before the date, loss experience is 
"u"'"""'A• the current market is also checked for risk-loss ratio, 
brackets, etc.; that they to "make 
the best deal they can" for their clients; that the practice 
and custom of the ''American '' is that the 
brokers ''own'' the their customer list; and that 
the broker and carrier know the dates. Being 
the "owner," the broker is free to the busines!'l where 
he wishes on expiration. Each witness testified that he had 
placed business with Company, had placed it previously with 
Exchange, and had also business with other companies. 
They also stated that the Transfe1' and Agreement 
whereby Company took over had no influence what-
ever on their rlecisions to 
Several witnesses testified lmew Company and 
Exchange had had the sanw and when Exchange 
went out of business business with Company 
for that reason, but they also that they would not have 
done so if they could have obtained a better "deal" elsewhere. 
There was also that some business was placed with 
Company at the client's because of mvnership interest 
in Company. Defendant that seven other named 
brokers would testify 
Defendant made no to rebut the foregoing testimony 
and produced no witnesses who testifierl to the contrary. De-
fendant's argument appears to be that even though future 
profits are not and were not an asset of Exchange, Company 
shoulrl not be allo·wcrl to tlv::m, not because there is any 
evidence of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, mishandling 
these 
account of 
of Exchange. 
The evidence 
Agreement; and 
sumed the 
rights to the fees. 
assets 
the 
The trial court was correct in that the Underwriters 
Agreement remained in effect and covered all policies written 
in 1948. The Transfer and did nor. 
expressly or impliedly supersede the Underwriters Agreement. 
Under the Underwriters the Attorney-in-Fact had 
full power to reinsure; it also had full power to enforce rights 
and discharge liabilities in the same way as an individual 
subscriber could do. 
The Transfer and Assumption Agreunent provided tl1n: 
Company would reinsure all outstanding policies and would 
perform all the of Exchange under the terms of 
the policies. The was a part of each 
policy written. 
The for insurance with Exchange provided : 
"This application if to the foregoing state-
ments and declarations and is further to the condi-
tions of the which are made a part 
hereof and which are the as follows: 
... " Thereafter follows the Underwriters Agreement. The 
last clause of the : '"rhis agreement is 
strictly limited to the use and purposes herein expressed and 
in-Fact 
to the 
267 
account shall be 
credit returned." 
"'"''""''""''''" did not ~nv~.~~+ 
to terminate the 
and agreements 
time hereafter assert any 
the Attorney-
it may have in and 
and will not at any 
whatever in or to said special 
" 
to the Transfer Agreement did not intend 
the Underwriters is evidenced by 
executed between and Company on 
to perform and 
Hr'~"c" with respect to the 
insurance issued assigned to Com-
pany its thereunder and that it would not "at 
any time make any claim whatever that it is entitled to the 
whole or any of the account designated as 'Special 
as shown on the books of the as of the 
close of business on December 1948.' 
There is no contention that the services were not performed 
in accordance with the or that did not 
have a to appears from the 
Underwriters Fees were never 
a even may have 
a consequence of the Transfer 
That the trial court erred in that the 
Fund was not a of the business or assets 
268 INDUSTRIAL 
The 
investment income it shall 
shall be credited to the 
STATE Co. [49 C.2d 
: ''A Special Sur-
which shall be set aside all 
fund and no part thereof 
of any individual subscriber; 
it shall be used for the benefit of the as the Ad-
Insurance Commissioner, 
the expense of, and as 
the trial court 
Fund was, under the Under-
reserved for expenses incurred in 
connection with liquidation and to Attorney; that 
'-111 November 15, this was assigned to Company as com-
pensation for work heretofore performed in connection with 
the liquidation of less such portion as required to 
reimburse Attorney for future costs of liquidation; and that 
the subscribers have no right or claim to this surplus since it 
was not a part of 's business or assets. (Finding 
IX.•) 
After the District Court of Appeal's first decision, Attor-
ney and Company entered into an agreement restoring the 
business and assets of Exchange to Attorney as Attorney-in-
Fact of Exchange, subject to Attorney's obtaining a certificate 
of authority from the Insurance Commissioner. Thereafter 
such a certificate was issued for the limited purpose of dis-
charging the obligations under the policies and Underwriters 
*Finding IX reads: "Under the terms of the Underwriters' Agree-
ments, Exchange at all times maintained a Special Surplus Fund con-
sisting of all investment income received on Exchange funds; this fund, 
in the event Exchange discontinues business and after full provision for 
liabilities to the satisfaction of the Insurance Commissioner, is to be 
paid to Underwriters to defray the expenses of and as compensation for 
liquidation. The amount of this fund as of March 31, 1954, was 
$592,322.31. Underwriters written agreement dated November 15, 
1953, a true copy of which been received in evidence as Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 38, has agreed without notice to the defendants and cross-
complainants G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R 
Ballinger & Son, a corporation, and Minna M. Ballinger, to pay to 
Company as compensation for work heretofore performed by Company 
on behalf of Underwriters in connection with the liquidation of the 
Exchange, a sum equal to the surplus which Underwriters may 
less such portion of special surplus as may be required 
to Underwriters for incurred and future costs of liquidation. 
The subscribers of have no or claim to any portion of 
this special surplus and it not any part of the business, 
property or assets of the Exchange to which the subscribers are en-
titled." 
between and 
, "The Attorney-in-Fact 
further agrees that it will not at any time make any claim 
whatever that it is entitled to the whole or any portion of 
the account designated as ' ' as shown on the 
books of the Exchange as of the close of business on De-
cember 1948." 
Defendant ai:gues that Company waived its rights to this 
fund. The trial court found otherwise. After the first deci-
sion of the District Court of Appeal, Company reasserted its 
right to the fund in its answer to defendant's petition for 
retrial. 
Under the Underwriters Agreement, Attorney-in-Fact was 
entitled to this fund "if Exchange discontinues business," 
as compensation for up the affairs and liquidation. 
The question then arises whether Exchange has been ''dis-
continued." 'fhE: trial court found that it had, and the evi-
dence supports the 
It is to be noted that the Insurance Commissioner issued 
the certificate of authority to the extent necessary to 
wind up the affairs of Exchange. Exchange has no authority 
to issue new policies. Since the sum is not a part of the assets 
of Exchange, it is clear that the trial court's disposition of it 
was correct. 
It is also to be noted that defendant does not claim the 
policy contract, which included the Underwriters Agreement, 
Yl'as unfair or that the (subscribers of Ex-
change) had been taken advantage of by Company. The 1948 
policyholders were in no sense injured nor was Company 
unfairly enriched at their expense. 
Defendant's arguments to the are unsupported by 
the record. The court and the evidence amply supports 
the finding, that future Attorney Fees and the Special 
of an 
uernc1,uu that any such 
under terms of the Underwriters' 
ments and the of insurance issued to 
the power to cancel any such of insurance and to 
terminate the Underwriters' at any time upon ten 
days' notice and in the event of such Under-
writers had the to the subscribers' account and 
return any funds the subscribers' credit. The 
Underwriters' the 
Attorney-in-Fact could be 
"XII. Prior to December 
knowledge and approval of the Committee of the 
Exchange determined that it would not thereafter issue any 
new policies of insurance in the and no such policies 
have been issued. All of insurance issued to sub-
scribers of Exchange their terms on or before 
December 31, 1949. Since December has 
been engaged in no business for the liquidation of 
Exchange.'' 
The foregoing findings, which are not disputed, show that 
defendant and the other 1948 policyholders have not been 
injured by the execution of the Transfer and Assumption 
Agreement, and that they have received all to which they were 
entitled. Therefore, have not suffered either injury or 
damage. 
However, defendant claims that should be de-
prived of the benefits it received as a result the discontinu-
ance of business by This claim is based upon the 
contention that Company has been 
riched. The evidence does not 
1948 and several years 
largest volume of 
pensation insurance carriers in 
wrote the 
workmen's com-
When Attorney 
to, or 
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the court found that " did not use, 
succeed to or receive for its own account new or different 
information or policyholders or 
succeed to or receive any new or different management, name, 
or agency from as a con-
sequence of the Transfer and nor did 
it at any time or in any manner receive any management, 
name, or agency which was a part 
of the or assets of or belonged to the sub-
sttzJra.) 
either to or as a cause-
Transfer and Assumption Agreement, 
over any other carrier in the 
from the record that under the 
'' as and in use in the 
the renewals or expirations 
are owned by the or broker, and not by 
carrier. It is thus evident that Company has 
interest on the 
correct. This was an 
settled that in such a 
interest is 
enriched. 
claims the trial court erred in not 
The trial court's position was 
and the rule is 
the matter of awarding or 
within the sound discretion of the 
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trial 
and cases cited in nn. 60 and 
In the trial court found that had 
and therefore we cannot say it abused 
"""f'n<:iinrr allow interest on the award. 
APPEAL oF DEFENDANT JOHNSON CoRPORATION 
[5] Defendant Johnson contends that its 
cross-complaint was 
This contention is not sound. In a stockholders' derivative 
action interveners are but volunteers in the main original 
cause, and their counsel may not in the presenta-
tion of the main case save as counsel for the main stockholders 
may consent or the court may (Mann v. Superior 
Oaurl, 53 Cal.App.2d 272, 280 [2] [127 P.2d 970] [hearing 
denied by the Court] . ) 
In the present case the trial court was not bound to permit 
the intervention of others of the same class if their interests 
were properly protected. So far as the record discloses here, 
defendant Johnson Corporation's interests were fully and 
properly protected, and therefore the trial court did not err 
in dismissing its cr<)SS-co'm]placint. 
In view of our conclusions it is unnecessary to discuss other 
questions argued by counsel. 
The judgment and orders are each affirmed. 
Shenk, Schauer, and Spence, concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur. It is my view that the issues of 
law have been, as discussed and correctly 
disposed of in the by Mr. Justice McComb. 
Nevertheless, because diverges sharply among some 
of the justices, it appears proper to briefly supplement our 
discussion. 
In the arguments for the ausse:nt1ng theory, respondents 
have been termed That term is ordinarily 
connotive of evil intent as well as act. Under any per-
missible view of the record the term seems to me to be an 
unduly harsh to be AB appears from the 
Oct. INDUSTRIAL lNDEM. Co. v. GoLDEN STATE Co. 
f49 C.2d 255: 316 P.2d 966] 
273 
of the District Court of Appeal on the first appeal 
in this case (lndustriallndem. Co. v. Golden State Co. (1953), 
117 Cal.App.2d 527 [256 P.2d 677]}, the issue of il-
legality of the Transfer and Assumption Agreement by reason 
of the then provisions of section 1101 of the Insurance Code 
was injected into the case by that court. Until then respond-
ents were willing and fully intended to carry out their obliga-
tions under that agreement, which would have meant that the 
subscribers would have received $1,018,589.07, rather than 
only the $323,300.39 awarded them by the judgment which is 
now being affirmed. Despite this situation, the president of 
Company, who is also one of the partners of Attorney, testi-
fied that, regardless of the outcome of the case, it was the 
intention of respondents to pay the subscribers an amount 
equivalent to that which the subscribers would have received 
under the Transfer and Assumption Agreement, less costs 
of litigation. I believe that this further demonstrates the 
good faith of respondents, already conclusively shown, 1 and 
1lt is to be remembered that it is established that the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement was entered into in good faith and had the 
approval of the msurance commissioner. Obviously, in the conduct of 
respondents, there was no union of act and evil intent. The opinion 
of the District Court of Appeal on the first appeal (Industrial lndem. 
Co. v. Golden State Co. (19.53), supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 519) carefully 
notes many significant facts. Pertinent to the discussion, the opinion 
reads: 
"[P. 526] The court found in nearly all respects for the plaintiffs and 
against the cross-complainants ... The judgment declared in substance 
that past subscribers had no interest in the Exchange and were not 
entitled to participate in any distribution; that the transfer and assump-
tion agreement was fair and equitable, validly executed and binding on 
all past and present subscribers of Exchange, and that they had no 
right to any net worth or assets of Exchange except as provided in 
said agreement, that said agreement distributed to the subscribere 
all they were entitled to in the most equitable, reasonable and practical 
manner and that subscribers had no interest in the business or assets of 
Company ... 
"[P. 527] We have concluded that the original action for declaratory 
relief should have been denied because the agreement to which it relates 
is void as violating section llOl of the Insurance Code, expressly made 
applicable to reciprocal exchanges by section 1282 of said code. Sec-
tion 1101 reads insofar as applicable to this ~ase: 'An admitted in-
surer's officers, directors, trustees and any persons who have authority 
in the management of the msnrer's funds. shall not, unless otherwise 
provided in this coclc: . ( <' '1 ['ir~ctly or indirectly purchase, or be 
interested in the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer.' Section 
1106, Insurance Code, reads in part: 'Any person violating ... Sec-
tions 1101, ... is guilty of a misdemeanor.' 
''This exact point was not raised by any of the parties, but was 
briefed specially at the request of this court .... 
"[P. 534] In this case the court below made most elaborate findings 
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evidences their 
as set 
in payment of 
result under the 
Uli~H<O"» to 
go hand in hand : 
and enforces achieve Never-
theless, that the enforcement of law does not result 
justly was many ago, when the con-
cept was born. As in Owens v. 
(1896), 113 Cal. "144. 450 33 L.R.A. 369], "the 
law to promote 
justice, makes ., But, re-
grettably, sometimes appear which not even the 
reach of can make 
The articulated in section 1101 of the Insurance 
Code and relied upon the District Court of in 
holding the Transfer and to be illegal 
and void was justice. Its 
application in this case seems to me, to have resulted 
in a judgment understandably, some may feel on its 
face achieves the contrary, not so because of 
the substance of the now under consideration as be-
as to an circumstances on which it based its holding that the cross· 
defendants have not brea.:,hed their fiduciary duty. 
"[P. 5371 As we have held that the establishing of the circumstances 
under which the Attorney in workmen's compensation insurance 
business of its own and the of these circumstances in relation 
to the duty of fairness and incumbent on the Attorney as a 
fiduciary were matters of fact. the decision of which by the trier of facts 
is as a rule binding on it seems evident that the findings stated 
are fatal to the appeal respect to the elaims of subscribers of 
Exchange to the business of unless appellants have shown 
that they are not supported by evidence. This they have failed 
to do. 
"[P. 539] Under these circumstances it is not for us to say that 
the ultimate findings of the court below are necessarily improper in· 
ferences nor can we hold as matter of law, contrary to said findings, 
that the hreJwhed its fiduciary to subRcribers when it 
engaged in the of workmen insurance through the 
medium of Compnny or thnt tlw was in equity the 
of W c are the more that this result is 
profits of the business 
any of Company's in-
the subscribers of Exchange a windfall 
the setup such Exchange." 
; Pracnkel 
P .2d this connection it may be 
noted that under a HJ;J5 amendment to Insurance Code it 
appears that such an agreernent as that whieh gave rise to the 
current controversy may now be made and performed, 
thus that no basic of policy, fair-
ness, or justice was viol11ted when it was executed i.n 1948. 
Neither that nor enm the of the 
cited cases, could now affect the 
first I believe that the 
now being affirmed and 
the facts, which is all that the court under the limitations of 
the earlier holding could and ihat the out by 
respondents of their unenforceable but nevertheless 
voluntarily self-recognized and now self-drelared obligations 
under the 'l'ransfer and this 
to the most desirable conclusion which 
concurred. 
C. J.-I dissent. the of 
the court fails to to undisputed facts 
no1•n,,.,.,. a transaction in violation of statute as a con-
sequence, an result. 
The law of the case, as decided on 
dustrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State 
(In-
519 
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[256 P.2d 677]), is that the Transfer and Assumption Agree-
ment by which Company took over the whole business of 
Exchange was void because it violated section 1101 of the In-
surance Code1 and that the subscribers are entitled to recover 
the business and assets obtained by Company as a consequence 
of that agreement. The code section was designed to protect 
persons such as the subscribers against the detrimental action 
of those in a position like that of Attorney. The subscribers, 
therefore, are not to be considered in pari delicto with At-
torney and Company (Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 
Cal.2d 564, 574 [203 P.2d 758] ; see Lewis & Queen v. N. M. 
Ball Sons, 48 CaL2d 141, 152 [308 P.2d 713] ), and the 
latter are the parties legally responsible for the violation, even 
if they acted in good faith. 
It is undisputed, and the trial court found, that the Trans-
fer and Assumption Agreement was considered fair and 
equitable by Attorney and Company, that it was concluded 
openly with the consent of the Insurance Commissioner and 
of 98 per cent of the subscribers, and that the net worth of 
Exchange which would have been distributed to subscribers 
in accordance with the agreement, had it not been invalid, 
would have amounted to $1,018,589.07. Nevertheless, the 
judgment of the trial court affirmed by the majority awards 
the subscribers no more than $323.300.39 as the value of the 
business and assets of Exchange taken over by Company. Thus, 
as the decision of the majority stands. those for whose pro-
tection the violated statute was enacted will receive less than 
one-third of what would have been theirs under the agree-
ment, whereas those who are responsible for the violation will 
not only retain all of the benefits of the agreement but also ob-
tain a large financial windfall. It is true that the president 
of Company, who is also one of the partners of Attorney, testi-
fied that, regardless of the outcome of the case, it was the 
intention of Company to pay the subscribers an amount 
equivalent to that which the subscribers would have received 
under the void agreement, minus costs of litigation, but a 
court cannot be justified in rendering a decision which com-
pels a litigant to rely on the magnanimity of his opponent 
to obtain equity, unless such a result is unavoidable. I am 
1Section 1101 of the insurance Code provides: ''An admitted insurer's 
officers, directors, trustees and any persons who have authority in the 
management of the insurer's funds, shall not, unless otherwise provided 
in this code: .. _ (c) Directly or indirectly purchase, or be interestr.d 
in the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer." 
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satisfied that a proper application of the law to the facts 
before us not only but requires a more equitable result. 
There are three matters in controversy, namely, the profits 
realized by Company from the issuance of new insurance 
fJV"'-'""'' to former subscribers of Exchange, the sum referred 
to as attorney-in-fact fees, and the amount constituting the 
surplus fund. Although I share the view of the rna-
that there is snfiieient evidC'nce to support the trial 
court's finding that the business profits were not obtained as a 
consequence of the void 'rransfer and Assumption Agreement, 
I cannot agree as to the disposition of the other two items. The 
facts relating to them are undisputed, and only questions of 
law are presented. The conclusion of the majority, in my opin-
ion, results from an erroneous apfllication of the Underwriters 
Agreement to the illegal transac>tion under consideration. 
There can be no doubt that, mHlcr the Underwriters Agree-
ment, any right of Attorney to attorney-in-fact fees must 
arise from performance of the manageria1 functions connected 
with the business of Exchange. Undeniably, Attorney did not 
perform such functions between January 1, 1949. when the 
Transfer and Assumption Agreement was to take effect, and 
November 6, 1953. when assets of Exchange were restored by 
Company.2 It is obvious. therefore. that Attorney would not 
be entitled to fees allocable to that period. 
Nor can Company have any right to attorney-in-fact fees. 
Under the Underwriters Agreement, the fees were, of course, 
intended as compensation for management services rendered to 
Exchange, and, admittedly. Company did not at any time per-
form such services for Exchange but, inst0ad, performed them 
solely for its own account, mistakenly believing that it was 
the owner of Exchange's business. Any claim by Company 
to the contractual amount of fees would necessarily depend 
upon an effective assignment of Attorney's r1ghts. and there 
was no such assignment. The purported assignment in Janu-
ary of 1949 was, by its terms, made because of the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement.3 It was merely one step in the over-
all transaction by which Company illegally took over the busi-
2The agreement for restoration of a8sets was executed on NovembeT 
3, 1953, hut it was conditioned upon the Insurance Commissioner's issu-
ance to Attorney of a Certificate of Authority. and such a eertificate was 
issued on November 6, 19Ril. 
'The purported assignment in 1949, after reciting that Attorney was 
the Attorney-in-Fact for Exchange and was entitled to fees fo:r the per-
formance of certain services, provided : 
"WHEREAS, effective 12:01 A. M., January ], 1949, an of the assets 
C.2d 
and November 6, 1953, is 
any services, Company 
did not perform any services ''in accordance with the agree-
ment," and no effective was made. In my view, 
it is even if, as assumed by the majority 
opinion, the Underwriters continued in force, it 
does not support the position taken but, to the contrary, com-
pels the conclusion that the amount under consideration is 
an asset of the subscribers. 
The erroneous use of the Underwriters Agreement by the 
majority in holding that the subscribers are not entitled to 
the special surplus fund is The agreement 
''A Surplus Fund shall be created to which 
shall be set aside ali investment income; . . . it shall be used 
for the benefit of the as the Advisory Committee 
and discontinues busi-
for liabilities to the 
of the Insurance Commissioner, shall be paid to 
the attorney to the expense of. and as compensation 
of the ExCHANGE were transferred to l;oM:PANY and CoMPANY assumed 
all of the obligations of ExcHANGE including the obligation to per-
form eertain for which performance the ATTORNEY-IN-FACT 
to the ExcHANGE: and 
with the ExCHANGE, the ATTORNEY-
certain in addition to 
by it on or prior to the of business on 
agreed to perform the services re-
transferred and assigned its rights 
because of a sale of assets in violation of was 
to persons such as the 
the detrimental action of those in a 
torney. done its illegal 
of the business may be as constituting 
since the law of the case, as decided on the prior 
is that the void transfer under which Com-
pany acted was not an for the liquidation of Ex-
but one for of assets and assump-
tion of liabilities. (Industrial Indent Co. v. Golden State Co., 
117 CaLApp.2d 528 P.2d .) While it appears 
to be true because of the unlawful transaction, the busi-
ness cannot now be revived and must be liquidated, this can-
not reasonably be treated as rise to any right in 
The on March 31, 
1954, amounted to $592,322.31, was, of course, intended to 
relate to full and To hold that Attorney 
is entitled to the fund for the remnants of a busi-
destruction it participated represents 
an absurd of the Underwriters Agreement. In 
addition, such a holding would ignore the rule that one may 
not take of his since the statutory 
violation for which are responsible 
constitutes a wrong, faith. 
In view of the taken the it is not 
necessary in this dissent to consider whether, notwithstanding 
the of the action of and Attorney, some 
allowance should be favor for the actual cost 
that a proper 
fees and the 
surplus fund would increase the recovery 
of the subscribers. For it appears to be undisputed 
even if an allowance for actual costs were made, a re-
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fusal to grant Company fees would alone 
entitle the subscribers to $324.000 more than 
the amount awarded in the erroneous JUdgment affirmed by 
the majority. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Traynor, concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
'rhe reasoning and the conclusion reached by the majority 
and concurring opinions are shocking to both my sense of jus-
tice aud my legal concepts. If I am not mistaken this case 
will be appropriately classified in the annals of jurisprudence 
with other ''crimes in ink.'' It is obvious to my mind and 
I think it should be to any unbiased person that if this court 
should apply the law of the case to the undisputed factual 
background as disclosed by the record the inevitable result 
would be a reversal of the judgment of the trial court with di-
rections to retry the case in accordance with the law of the case 
as declared in the first decision of this caoo by the District 
Court of Appeal rendered on April 30th, 1953 (see Industrial 
lndem. Co. v. Golden State Co., 117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d 
677]). Simply stated, the undisputed factual situation ap-
pears to be: Plaintiff Industrial Indemnity Company, through 
its officers, and by means of their financial interests, controlled 
both Industrial Indemnity Exchange (hereinafter referred to 
as Exchange) and the Industrial Underwriters (hereinafter 
referred to as Attorney-in-Fact). Prior to January 1st, 1949, 
Exchange was the largest writer of workmen's compensation 
insurance in California. It was a reciprocal insurance organ-
ization of which defendants Golden State Company, Ltd., 
G. W. Thomas Draying & Rigging Company, Inc., W. R. 
Ballinger & Son, Minna M. Ballinger, Johnson Corporation, 
et al. were subscribers. Exehange was then in competition 
with plaintiff Industrial Indemnity Company in writing 
policies of workmen's compensation insurance. 
On December 21st, 1948, Industrial Indemnity Company, 
Industrial Indemnity Exchange, acting through its Attorney-
in-Fact and Advisory Committee, and Industrial Underwriters 
entered into a Transfer and Assumption Agreement which 
provided in part: 
''That in consideration of the mutual covenants herein con-
tained the parties hereto do hereby agree as follows: 
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I. REINSURANCE 
"A. Effective as 1, 1949, Ex-
does cede and does hereby completely 
reinsure all of insurance issued by the Exchange and 
effect as of said time and date. 
The agrees to carry out and all of 
.~:CJ2aliJtaiJLge under the terms of said poli-
insurance or any of and to be liable 
thereon to the of the The Company 
also undertakes to declare and pay policyholders' dividends in 
to policies of insurance issued by the Exchange accord-
to the terms of such policies on the basis of the Exchange 
dividend policy theretofore in effect. 
'II. TRANSFER OF AssETS 
"A. Effective 12:01 A.M., January 1, 1949, Exchange will 
sell, assign and transfer and it does hereby sell, assign and 
transfer to Company aU of the assets of the Exchange of what-
ever nature and kind, whether now known or hereafter dis-
covered, owned by it at said ti.rne and date, and whether or not 
appear·1:ng on its books as of said time and date. 
"III. AssuMPTION OF LIABILITIES AND PAYMENTS TO BE 
MADE 
"A. Company agrees to accept and does hereby accept the 
assignment and transfer of such assets as of the time and date 
herein provided, and agrees to perform the acts hereinafter 
set forth, and to pay the amounts computed as hereinafter 
provided at the times and in the manner hereinafter more 
particularly set forth. 
''B. In addition to the obligations assumed under para-
graph I hereof, Company agrees to assume and discharge and 
does hereby assume any and all other liabilities of the Ex-
change of whatever nature or kind in any manner incurred 
prior to 12 :01 A.M., January 1, 1949. 
"C. Arnounts to be paid: As compensation for the assign-
ment and transfer to it of the assets of the Exchange, Com-
pany will pay to the persons and in the manner herein set 
forth an amount equal to the 'adjusted net worth' of the 
Exchange, computed as follow;;: 
"1. UNAD.JUSTED NET 'NORTH: 
"An and it of the books of Industrial Indemnity Exchange 
as of the close of business December 31, 1948, will be caused 
to be made by the Company and the Advisory Committee 
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as soon after December as 
event, to the end of the month of 
C.2d 
audit shall be conducted on the same basis as audits of the 
Exchange have been made in re·~ent years, except that the 
reserve for losses and claims shall be upon the case 
basis rather than the 'Schedule P' formula basis. com-
of the an audited balance sheet as of Decem-
will be 
the I11surance 
to each member of the Committee of the Exchange. 
J:;,or purposes of such financial statement. the assets shall be 
valued at market value as of December 1948. A copy of 
such financial statement will thereupon be attached to this 
agreement, marked 'Exhibit A.' and except for possible errors 
in computation and possible omissions all the parties hereto 
agree to be and are hereby bound by said financial statement. 
"The unadjusted net worth of the Exchange as of the close 
of business on December 31, 1948. shall be the sum of the 
excess of statutory reserves for losses over case basis reserves 
for such losses, the reserve for contingencies. special surplus 
and unassigned surplus as shown on said financial state-
ment .... 
"IV. TIME AND AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS 
"The total net payments, equal to the adjusted net worth, 
to be made by the Company to the subscribers of the Ex-
change will be made by the Company at the following times: 
''A. $1,000,000.00 on or before March 31, 1949; 
"B. $500,000.00 on or before March 31, 1950; 
"C. Any balance remaining due, on or before March 31, 
1952. 
''By mutual agreement between the Company and the Ad-
visory Committee, and conditioned upon the prior approval 
of the Insurance Commissioner, the dates for and amounts 
of any of the foregoing payments may be postponed or 
changed, as may be justified by future developments. . .. 
"VII. WAIVER BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT oF RIGHTS IN SPECIAL 
SURPLUS: 
"In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the 
other parties hereto as herein contained, the Attorney-in-Fact 
hereby waives any and all rights which it may have in and 
to the special surplus of the Exchange, and will not at any 
time hereafter assert any rights whatever in or to said special 
surplus .••• 
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'"I' he agrees to pay to the individual subscribers 
entitled thereto the total amomct of the subscribers' individual 
fund paid or maintained as of December 31, 
each of said such payment to be made 
each individual subscriber entitled thereto on or vvithin a 
reasonable time after the termination of his policy. 
the event that at such time there shall be due and 
from such subscriber any arising under a policy 
issued the on or before December 31, 1948, such 
subscriber's individual surplus fund deposit shall, to the 
extent of any such premium due and unpaid, be credited or 
applied in payment thereof." (Emphasis added.) 
At the time this agreement was executed K. K. Bechtel 
was president of Industrial Indemnity Company. He was 
also managing partner of Industrial Underwriters, Attorney-
in-Fact for Industrial Indemnity Exchange. While Mr. 
Bechtel did not sign the contract on behalf of Industrial In-
demnity Company, he signed it as managing partner of In-
dustrial Underwriters, Attorney-in-Fact for Industrial In-
demnity Exchange and as a member of the Advisory Com-
mittee of Industrial Indemnity Exchange and as managing 
partner of Industrial Underwriters. The contract was exe-
cuted on behalf of Industrial Indemnity Company by Thomas 
G. McGuire, Executive Vice-President. It was found by the 
trial court and conceded by all of the parties to this litigation 
that Mr. Bechtel and his associates in Industrial Indemnity 
Company, by virtue of their financial interests, controlled all 
of the parties to said agreement. In this respect the District 
Court of Appeal in its first decision of this case cited supra 
stated: "Neither is it denied nor could it be denied that the 
members of the Attorney are persons who have authority in 
the management of the funds of the Exchange. The interrela-
tion between the Attorney and the Company, which is at the 
basis of this whole case, leaves no doubt that said partners in 
the Attorney would be interested in, at least indirectly, any 
purchase made by the Company. In this respect it will suffice 
to quote from finding 16 of the court the following passus 
which is not attacked: 
" 'The stock ownership of Industrial Indemnity Company 
has at all times been substantially the same as the ownership 
of Industrial Underwriters, a partnership, the attorney-in-
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fact of the "'""'-'.U<"'" 528 
P.2d 
Prior to the execution of said an attempt had 
been made Mr. Bechtel and his associates to procure the 
consent of all of the subscribers of the to said 
Transfer and and they succeeded in 
Francisco 
subscribers of Industrial 
98 per cent of said 
then commenced 
and of San 
Agreement. 'l'he nonconsenting subscribers cross-complained 
in said action, claiming that ali the insurance business trans-
acted by Industrial Indemnity Company belonged in equity to 
Exchange, from whose buRiness it was alleged to have been 
disloyally diverted by Industria! Underwriters, the Attorney-
in-Fact of said Exchange, whose partners substantially owned 
the stock of Industrial Indemnity Company. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff Industrial Indemnity 
Company the relief demanded by it in said action and denied 
any relief to the objecting subscribers. 
The subscribers appealed and the District Court of Appeal 
in its decision cited supra, reversed the judgment and decree 
of the trial court and laid down the following rules which 
constitute the law of the ease and should have controlled the 
subsequent disposition of the case: 
(1) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that 
the Transfer and Assumption Agreement constituted a sale of 
all of the assets and business of Exchange to Company. In 
this respect the court stated at page 530: "Respondents urge, 
however, that even if it were an actual sale, as we consider it, 
the agreement would come under an exception to section 1101 
[of the Insurance Code] .... " (Emphasis added.) 
(2) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that Ex-
change was not in liquidation. In response to the contention 
of Company that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement 
was actually an agreement to liquidate, the court stated at 
pages 528 and 529: Company contends that "the transaction 
was actually an agreement to liquidate. However that is not 
the case. . . . Another circumstance which shows that the 
Company did not act merely as liquidator is of greater im-
portance from a practical point of view. By taking over all 
assets, assuming all liabilities, including all outstanding 
policies of the Exchange and becoming directly liable thereon 
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to the policyholders, the Company acquired the whole busi-
ness of the Exchange as a going concern and would therefore 
benefit the increase of its clientele." 
In answer to Company's contention that the Insur-
ance Commissioner could require the sale of Exchange to 
Company (section 1 the District Court of Appeal specifi-
held at page 530: "'I' he contention is without merit. 
The Commissioner did not and had no power to require 
the sale of the whole business of the Exchange as a going 
concern. To 'require' in this sense means 'to demand ; to 
claim as by right and authority: to exact.' (Webster.) The 
Commissioner did not demand it and had no authority to de-
mand it.'' 
( 4) The District Court of Appeal held that the Transfer 
and Assumption Agreement was illegal and void because in 
contravention of section 1101 of the Insurance Code, which 
provides that an admitted insurer's officers, directors, trustees 
or any persons having authority to manage the insurer's funds 
shall not ''directly or indirectly purchase, or be interested in 
the purchase of, any of the assets of the insurer." It further 
held that section 1106 makes any violation of section 1101 a 
misdemeanor. In this respect the court stated at page 527: 
"We have concluded that the original action fbrought by 
Company] for declaratory relief should have been denied be-
cause the agreement to which it relates is void as violating 
section 1101 of the [nsurance Code. expressly made applicable 
to reciprocal exchanges by section 1282 of said code." 
(5) With respect to the contentions made by Company that 
it acted in "good faith" because it did not know the law for-
bade the transaction and made such a violation of the law 
a crime, the court stated at page 532: ''Even if their said 
conduct was in good faith and proper, as found by the court 
below, it would create a precedent wholly adverse to the pur-
pose of section 1101, subdivision (c). if they were permitted 
to solve the difficulties so caused by absorbing the going busi-
ness of the Exchange into their privately owned corporation. 
even if the price they paid for it would be adequate." 
(6) The District Court of Appeal specifically held that the 
officers of plaintiff and the other parties to the Agreement 
were acting in a fiduciary capacity and could not seize for 
themselves the assets of Exchange as contemplated by the 
'rransfer and Assumption Agreement. At page 533 the court 
said: "Since the leading case of Gnth v. Loft, 23 Del.Ch. 255 
[ 5 A.2d 503], it has been generally accepted that a corporate 
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officer or director may not seize for himself to the detriment 
of his company business in the line 
of activities which the company has an interest and prior 
claim to obtain, and that if he seizes them in violation of his 
fiduciary the may claim for itself all benefits 
so obtained him. 'l'he doctrine was 
venturers in Macisaac v. 81 
P.2d , and is applicable in all situations in which 
a person manages or transacts business for another or for 
others to whom he stands in a fiduciary relation without being 
trustee of an express trust. The position of the attorney-in-
fact of a reciprocal insurance exchange, who manages the 
business of the exchange under powers of attorney of the sub-
scribers, who provide the means for the reciprocal insurance 
enterprise, is fiduciary in character to the same extent as that 
of the management of an incorporated mutual insurance com-
pany, although neither is a real trustee. (See Caminetti v. 
State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 321, 323 P26 P.2d 
165]) and the doctrine of corporate opportunities is equally 
applicable.'' 
With respect to the language of the court concerning the 
evidence as supporting the findings of fact of the trial court 
that Company had not breached its fiduciary duty toward 
Exchange, it is obvious that it was referring to the contention 
of Exchange that it was entitled to the whole business of Com-
pany because it said at page 539: ''Under these circumstances 
it is not for us to say that the ultimate findings of the court 
below are necessarily improper inferences nor can we hold as 
a matter of law, contrary to said findings, that the Attorney 
breached its fiduciary duty to subscribers when it engaged 
in the writing of workmen's compensation insttrance through 
the medium of Company or that the bnsiness of Company 
was in equity the property of Exchange. We are the more 
satisfied that this result is not unjust because the gain by 
Exchange of all profits of the business of Company without 
partic1:pation in them by any of Company's insureds would 
have given the subscribers of tlw Exchange a windfall wholly 
out of line with the setup of such Exchange." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The findings of the tria] court that Company had not 
breached its fiduciary duties toward Exchange were, there-
fore, held by the District Court of Appeal to relate to Com-
pany's participating in the workmen's compensation insur-
ance field before the take-over of Exchange ; and to 
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to such take-over. It is obvious that 
this discussion on the part of the District Court of Appeal 
does not relate to breach of its fiduciary duty to 
in the Transfer and Assumption Agree-
ment, which it had theretofore held to be an invalid, illegal 
and void agreement of and sale. 
'l'he conclusions reached in the District Court of Appeal 
were as follows: 1. ''Although we hold that the sub-
scribers of Exchange are not entitled to the business built 
np in then are necessarily 
not entitled either to the business of its wholly owned sub-
Industrial Service Company, mentioned separately 
on appeal-they have a right to the business taken over by 
Company in consequence of the transfer and assumption 
agreement, which we have held to be invalid. If they so desire 
they are entitled to have that matter wound up in these equity 
proceedings and for that purpose the judgment denying all 
relief on the cross-complaints [by Exchange] will also have 
to be reversed." (Emphasis added.) 
2. The trial court was directed to "deny all declaratory 
relief to plaintiffs [Company] on the ground that the agree-
ment as to which it is prayed for is void as contrary to 
law .... " 
3. The trial court was directed to grant such relief to Ex-
change as to permit them to recover in ''their representative 
capacity for subscribers the business and assets obtained by 
Company in consequence of the agreement herein held to be 
i.nvalid. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
The gist of the decision of the District Court of Appeal cited 
supra which is now the law of the case, may be summarized 
as follows: The Transfer and Assumption Agreement dated 
December 21st, 1948, constituted an attempted sale of all of 
the business and assets of Exchange to Industrial Indemnity 
Company. Such a sale was illegal in face of the objection of 
the nonconsenting subscribers to Exchange. The illegality of 
such sale and transfer was based both upon common law 
rules and statutory law of this state. It violated common law 
rules because the officers of the participating companies were 
acting in a fiduciary capacity to the subscribers of Exchange. 
Those officers violated their fiduciary duty under the common 
law by appropriating to their own use the property of the 
subscribers of Exchange without their consent. The legal 
effect of this transaction was that the directors and officers of 
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because of their financial '"'+""""'"'t" 
Exchange, Industrial Underwriters and Attorney-in-Fact, 
used their power of control to deprive subscribers of Exchange 
of their property rights in in violation of their 
:fiduciary duty to subscribers which no court of justice should 
sanction. The transaction was in violation of the statutory 
law of this state because and specifically prohibited 
by section 1101 of the Insurance the violation of which 
section was made a misdemeanor section 1106 of the Insur-
ance Code. Because the entire transaction was illegal for the 
reasons above stated and the participants therein were guilty 
of a crime under the law of this state, Industrial Indemnity 
Company had no standing in a court of justice to enforce the 
Agreement and its action brought for this purpose was or-
dered dismissed. The court, however, reserved to the non-
consenting subscribers the right to resort to the court for the 
protection of their rights which should contemplate the 
restoration by Company to the Exchange of the business and 
assets illegally appropriated or an award of compensation 
adequate to cover the value of such business and assets so 
illegally appropriated together with all accrued increments 
therefrom. 
It is obvious that the trial court on the retrial of the case 
utterly disregarded the law of the case as declared by the first 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal cited supra. In direct 
violation of the law of the case announced in said decision the 
trial court held and found that Industrial Indemnity Com-
pany took over the business and assets of Exchange for the 
purpose of liquidation and that Exchange was not entitled to 
the going concern value of its business at the time of the 
illegal transaction. It charged Exchange with the cost and 
expenses incurred by Company in winding up the business of 
Exchange and awarded to Company assets of Exchange worth 
considerably over a million dollars without awarding sub-
scribers of Exchange any compensation therefor. 
The obviously palpable result and legal effect of the deci-
sion of the trial court on the retrial of this case was to deprive 
the subscribers of Exchange of their property which consisted 
of a valuable beneficial interest in the business of Exchange 
without due process of law. A clear and concise statement 
with respect to the protection of the right of private property 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States was made by Mr. ,Justice Day of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 
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at page 74 . Speaking for a 
unanimous court he there declared : ''The Constitu-
tion and laws within its authority are by the express 
terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land. 
The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty, and prop-
from invasion the States without due process of law. 
Pr,r;n.<>l't·.v is more than the mere thing which a person owns. 
It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and 
of it. The Constitution protects these essential at-
tributes of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 
S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780]. Property consists of the free 
use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions with-
out control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 
Blackstone's Commentaries (Cooley's Ed.), 127." In Brink-
erhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 [50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed. 
1107], the Supreme Court of the United States specifically 
held that judicial action as state action is within the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At pages 681 
and 682 the court stated: ''But, while it is for the state courts 
to determine the adjective as well as the substantive law of 
the State, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due process 
of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or through its 
legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing 
remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State 
has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to 
him some real opportunity to protect it. Compare Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. N ewpo·rt, 247 U.S. 464, 475-6 [38 S.Ct. 
566, 62 L.Ed. 1215]." (Emphasis added.) 
We have here a situation where the beneficial interests-
the property rights of Exchange and subscribers in the busi-
ness and assets of Exchange are taken from them by Com-
pany without their consent and in violation of both common 
law rules and statutory law, and Company and its officers 
committed a crime under the law of this state when it and 
they appropriated the property of Exchange and subscribers 
to the use of Company by means of the illegal and void Trans-
fer and Assumption Agreement. Under every concept of law, 
equity, justice or fair dealing, Exchange and subscribers are 
entitled to have their property or its full value restored to 
them with all accrued increments. But under the majority 
decision in this case, property, admittedly worth approxi-
mately two million dollars at the time it was illegally ap-
propriated by Company, with all its accrued increments of 
411 C.M-141 
under any 
entitled to the """'n""'r 
fair-minded men. have believed that the 
of the due process clauses both our state and 
federal Constitutions a fair and honest 
tion of the settled rules of law to established 
situation. by this process may The 
result reached by the here 
every of due process of law with I am familiar. 
The majority glosses over the damning fact that in seizing 
the business and assets of Exchange in the manner shown by 
the record here, Company and itR officers committed a crime--
a misdemeanor (see Ins. Code, §§ 1101, 1106) - and since 
overt acts were committed in the furtherance of an unlawful 
agreement, the crime amounted to a felony under the law of 
this state (Pen. Code, § 182; Calhoun v. S1tperior Court, 46 
Cal.2d 18 [291 P.2d 474] ; People v. JJialotte, 46 Cal.2d 59 
[292 P.2d 517] ; Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49 
[216 P.2d 859] ; People v. Robinson, 43 Cal.2d 132 [271 P.2d 
865]; People v. Vanderpool, 20 Cal.2d 746 [128 P.2d 513]). 
The illegal and void Transfer and Assumption Agreement 
itself makes out a clear case of conspiracy to violate sections 
1101 and 1106 of the Insurance Code by the participants in 
this illegal transaction. Of course, no prosecution was insti-
tuted against them. This is just another exampl~ of the 
unequal administration of our criminal law. There can be 
no doubt that the power and influence of the participants 
in this illegal transaction weighed heavily in the iletermina-
tion of the prosecuting officials not to proceed against them 
under the above cited authorities. We also find two justices 
of this court (see concurring of .Justices Schauer and 
Shenk) expressing their approval and commendation of the 
unlawful conduct of these participants in the consummation 
of this illegal transaction. This demonstrates the truth of the 
charge made by some critics of our judicial system that those 
with sufficient wealth, power and influence can evade the law 
and that the phrase "equal justice under law'' is empty and 
meaningless in such situations. It is obvious that on the 
record before us justice has been outraged by the result 
reached by the majority and those who believe in the ideal 
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' as well as the victims of this 
In my considered 
it may be found in the inferences which may be 
dravm from the time honored expression that 
·'You can't convict a million dollars.'' 
The essential facts of the here are very 
and up of the same mom-
one and the same person 
with a of the membership Exchange 
for the of the assets of Exchange some of whose 
members refused to consent to the purchase and sale. The 
price was $1,018,539.07. After a series of legal 
maneuvers be discussed hereinafter), instigated by Com-
pany, Exchange subscribers, the innocent victims of the swin-
dle, are held legally entitled to only the sum of $323,300.39. 
Company brought the original action for declaratory relief 
regarding the rights of subscribers of Exchange. The original 
action culminated in an estimated award to Exchange of 
$1,895,347.07. Exchange appealed. The District Court of 
Appeal reversed on the ground that the Agreement was illegal, 
void and of no effect, and directed that an accounting be had 
to determine the value of the "whole going business" of Ex-
change which had been, by means of the Agreement, illegally 
taken over by Company. Company, believing it had lost in 
the District Court of Appeal, petitioned this court for a hear-
We denied a hearing. The opinion of the District Court 
of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d 677]) thereby 
became the law of the case on a retrial of the action. 
On retrial Exchange recovered $323,300.89 as the value of 
their "whole going business" which had been illegally taken 
over by Company as compared with the sum of $1,895,347.07 
recovered by it at the first trial from which judgment Ex-
change had appealed and won a reversaL The judgment ren-
dered on the second trial was appealed by Exchange and 
determined by the same District Court of Appeal which had 
heard the first appeal. On the second appeal ( (Cal.App.) 301 
P.2d 112) the judgment was reversed with the District 
Court of Appeal holding that the decision theretofore ren-
dered by it had not been followed by the trial court and stat-
ing, among other things, that because of the judgment on 
retrial "the Company will have in fact everything, for which 
it agreed in the invalid to pay considerably more 
than one million dollars to the subscribers and will pay for it 
$323,300.39.,. 
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At the time of the second trial the evidence showed indis-
putably that Company had collected over 20 million dollars 
in gross premiums because of the increased business it had 
obtained through the illegal take-over of Exchange. 'l'he net 
profit was not ascertained. The District Court of Appeal 
specifically held, on the first that by means of the 
illegal agreement Company increased its clientele. It was 
there held that by its illegal "the Company ac-
quired the whole business of Exchange as a going concern and 
would therefore benefit by the increase of its clientele.'' Con-
sents to the illegal agreement were obtained by sending out, 
in addition to 80 or 90 solicitors of consents, a letter which 
read, in part: "At normal expiration of your policy, in 
1949 you will be offered a participating policy in Industrial 
Indemnity Company, a stock company .... Your policy with 
Industrial Indemnity Company will be serviced by the same 
personnel, located at the same offices as in the past." The 
District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 P.2d 
677]) commented on Company's tactics as follows: ''That in 
this manner the Company received an advantage not consist-
ent with the position of a mere liquidator seems obvious." 
By the holding of the majority here, Company profits by 
its illegal conduct in that it is permitted to: 
1. Retain all the net profits directly traceable to former 
Exchange subscribers although the loss experience was de-
ducted from Exchange's recovery; 
2. Retain the special surplus fund of $592,322.31 and the 
increment thereof to which it was not entitled since Exchange 
was not in liquidation but had been illegally put out of 
business by Company and since the original underwriters' 
agreements were no longer in existence ; 
3. Retain the Attorney-in-Fact fees which amounted, at the 
time of trial, to $324,751.07 to which it was not entitled since 
the original underwriters' agreements were no longer in exist-
ence but were superseded by the illegal agreement. 
In the majority opinion the issue as to net profits is dis-
cussed and the discussion relative thereto consists of quoting 
thirteen findings of fact and then making the bald, unadorned 
statement that" It logically follows that since the trial court's 
findings were supported by evidence and covered the issue 
that the appellate court had ordered to be retried, the judg-
ment in the principal amount should be affirmed." 
A slight attempt is made in the majority opinion to show 
that these findings are supported by the evidence in that 
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to the effect that since the pv.u"·'""' 
were renewed there was no assurance that Exchange 
would have had any future subscribers had it not been illegally 
out of business. Inasmuch as the record, as the majority 
shows that had been the company of 
its kind for a to being illegally 
behind the ma-
tinned in business in any event is 
no attempt is made in the majority opinion to 
reconcile the made the trial court with the law 
of the ease as set forth by the District Court of Appeal in its 
first opinion CaLApp.2d 519 [256 P.2d 677]). Isolated 
bits of testimony extracted from the enormous record before 
us in support of erroneous findings do not concern us, or should 
not concern us, when there is a question of law involved. 
We are not concer·necl with whether or not the evidence sup-
ports these erroneous findings and conclnsions since it is 
obvio1ts that the trial court was not following the law of the 
case as laid down by the decision of the District Court of 
Appeal, supra. The very fact that the trial court considered 
Exchange to be in liquidation shows the error, since liquida-
tion is the antithesis of a going business concern. It is also 
obvious that the judgment permitting Company to obtain all 
assets of Exchange for a lesser figure than that provided for 
in the void Agreement is in contravention of the holding of 
the District Court of Appeal that Company and Attorney 
stood in a fiduciary relationship so far as Exchange was 
concerned and that a fiduciary may not benefit by a breach 
of its duties to its beneficiary. The District Court of Appeal 
specifically held in its first opinion (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 
P.2d 677]) that the doctrine of corporate opportunities was 
applicable; that if a corporate officer or director seized for 
himself such opportunities "in violation of his fiduciary duty 
the corporation may claim for itself all benefits so obtained by 
him" (emphasis added) 117 Cal.App.2d at p. 533) and that 
the purchase of Exchange constituted the breach of Company-
Attorney's fiduciary duty to Exchange subscribers. This 
court held in Estate o.f Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 258 [223 P. 974]. 
while discussing the law of the case as decided in a former 
appeal in the same case, that "It was no part of the trial 
court's function to determine '.vhether the former appeal had 
been correctly decided; its sole duty was to follow without 
question the principles established by that decision. This 
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the trial court failed 
demned are therefore erroneous within the mean-
ing of the constitution art. VI)." We also held 
(Central Sav. Bank Oakland v. 201 Cal. 438, 44:1 
[257 P. 521]) that "It has been the law of this state 
that an unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial 
(Falkner v. 107 Cal. 54 P. ) , and 
the in the trial court in the same 
with the "'~''""''~u., 
the cmtrt on as applicable 
(Sharp v. 177 
Cal. 367 P. 846])." (Emphasis added.) (See also 
Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452, 457 [132 P.2d 471]; Chamber-
lain Co. v. Allis-Chalrners Mfg. Co., 74 Cal.App.2d 941, 943 
[170 P.2d 85]; Steeldnct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Cal.2d 
634,643 [160 P.2d 804]; Wallace v. Sisson, 114 Cal. 42,43 [45 
P. 1000]; Por·ter v. Muller, 112 Cal. 355, 366 [44 P. 729]: 
Clark v. Deschamps, 109 Cal.App.2d 765 [241 P.2d 681] .) 
We are not here concerned with the method by which Ex-
change's recovery should be determined since that is a matter 
to be determined on a retrial upon evidence given by experts 
in the insurance actuarial field. We are concerned here with 
what items should be considered a part of the subscribers' 
recovery. 
Future Profits 
In order to demonstrate conclusively that the findings do not 
follow the law of the case as set forth by the District Court 
of Appeal, I will summarize that court's holdings and compare 
them with the trial court's findings: 
1. The District Court held that the Transfer and Assump-
tion Agreement constituted a purchase by Company of Ex-
change and that such Agreement was illegal and void. It was 
specifically held that Exchange was not in liquidation. 
Finding IV recites that Underwriters hold the property and 
assets of Exchange ''for distribution to the subscribers of the 
Exchange in liquidation of its business and affairs . ... " 
Company contended on the first appeal that the Agreement 
"was actually an agreement to liquidate." The District Court 
of Appeal said: "However, that is not the case .... Another 
circumstance which shows that the Company did not act 
merely as liquidator is of greater importance from a practical 
point of view. By taking over all assets, assuming all lia-
bilities, including all outstanding policies of the Exchange 
and becoming directly liable thereon to the policyholders, the 
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and 
the effect that under the "no 
n.:>.eu;ttu1,;e with respect to the 
uvuc.te:s taken over there-
under; that because of the of the the 
loss thereon must be charged up to That loss 
amounted to 
Finding V recites that no policies written after December 
1948, for or on behalf of any former subscribers of Ex-
form any part of the net worth of Exchange. 
These findings are in direct conflict with the express holding 
of the District Court of Appeal that Company illegally and 
unlawfully took over the" whole going business of Exchange." 
Findings XIII and XIV are to the effect that policies of 
insurance were placed voluntarily with either Exchange or 
Company on a year to year basis and that all policies placed 
with Company after December 31, 1948, on behalf of persons 
who had formerly been policyholders of Exchange were volun-
tarily placed with Company as new items of business by 
insurance agents who were free to place sueh policies with such 
insurance carrier as they chose. Finding XIV concluded that 
no policy was placed with Company "by reason of or as a con-
sequence of activities of Company being performed under, or 
arising as a consequence of, the Transfer and Assumption 
Agreement or because Company was regarded in any sense as 
being the successor of Exchange.'' 
The District Cot~rt of Appeal held firmly amd unequivocally 
that due to Company's conduct in sending solicitors out and 
in mailing a letter to all Exchange subscribers it obtained an 
increase in iis clientele to which it would not otherwise have 
been entitled. 
Finding XVIII recites that Company did not use or receive 
any information from Exchange as a consequence of the illegal 
agreement. 
Company had the information due to the interlocking rela-
tionship between it and Attorney and it was due to that 
information that it was able to contact all Exchange sub-
scribers and obtain their bu;;iness on the theory that the 
business placed with it would be serviced with the same per-
sonnel and from the same offices as it had been when lli:l!::cw:ln~~e 
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was a going business concern. Furthermore, the solicitation 
and letters were both accomplished while Exchange was still 
a going concern. 
Finding XXXI recites in effect that it is not true that 
Exchange was entitled to any future profits. 
This of course directly belies the mandate of the District 
Court of Appeal that Company illegally took over the whole 
going business of Exchange ; that an accounting should be 
had to determine the value thereof; that Company increased 
its clientele through its illegal tactics. The evidence also 
showed indisputably that Company had collected over 20 
million dollars in gross premiums due to the increased busi-
ness it had obtained because of the illegal take-over of Ex-
change. 
The only effort made in the majority opinion to comply 
with the law of the case is to set forth the findings on the 
retrial and state without amplification that they are within 
the issue ordered to be retried and that they are supported 
by the evidence. 
The District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519 [256 
P.2d 677]) did not hold that Exchange was not entitled to 
the profits accruing by reason of the illegal take-over of its 
business by Company. It did hold that Exchange subscribers 
were not entitled to the profits made from both Exchange 
and Company business. The court had this to say (p. 539): 
"Under these circumstances it is not for us to say that the 
ultimate findings of the court below are necessarily improper 
inferences nor can we hold as a matter of law, contrary to 
said findings, that the Attorney breached its fiduciary duty to 
subscribers when it engaged in the writing of workmen's com-
pensation insurance through the medittm of Company or that 
the business of Company was in equity the property of Ex-
change. We are the more satisfied that this res?tlt is not un.fust 
becattse the gain by Exchange of all the profits of the business 
of Company without participation in them by any of Com-
pany's insureds would have given the subscribers of the Ex-
change a windfall wholly out of line with the setup of such 
Exchange." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion 
shows clearly that the District Court was referring to the 
business of Company as distinguished from the profits made 
by Company from the bnsiness taken away from Exchange 
sttbscribers since the statement was in answer to a contention 
made by Exchange that it was entitled to all of Company's 
business in the compensation insurance field before the unlaw-
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of the evidence said to be 
<>uJcwc,eu.c, it is immaterial in event Rince the are 
not in accord with the law of the case. The very fact that 
indisputably, 
"'"'w-''w" was in shows the 
error since is the antithesis of a going business 
concern. It is also obvious that the permitting 
Company to obtain all assets of for a lower figure 
than that for in the void Agreement is in contra-
uv1.uu'~ of the District Court of Appeal that 
stood in relationship so far 
as Exchange was concerned and that a fiduciary may not 
benefit by a breach of its duties to its beneficiary. 
So far as business profits are the law is that 
where there has been a breach of a duty, a construc-
tive trust is imposed upon a person in order to prevent his 
unjust enrichment. In most cases where a constructive trust 
is imposed, the result is to restore to the injured person 
property of which he has been deprived and to take 
from the wrongdoer property, the retention of which by him, 
would result in a corresponding unjust enrichment of the 
wrongdoer. (/{oyer v. Willmon, 150 Cal. 785 [90 P. 135]; 
Broder v. Conklin, 121 Cal. 282 [53 p. 699] ; Johnson V. mark, 
7 Cal.2d 529 P.2d 767] ; Forman v. Goldberg, 42 Cal.App. 
2d 308 [108 P.2d Restitution, §§ 160, 190.) It 
follows logically from the that before Exchange may 
be made whole for what has been illegally taken from it by 
Company, the latter must be forced to return to Exchange 
that which was taken with the made therefrom. 
Exchange intri:>duced evidence showing that it was possible 
to trace former Exchange business for the five-year period 
subsequent to the execution of the illegal Agreement. The 
majority would have us assume that had the illegal Agreement 
not been executed all of subscribers would have 
ceased being Exchange subscribers and placed their business 
with is neither nor 
able; had been a prosperous concern for many 
yean; prior to the execution of the and would, in 
all probability, have eontinued as one. 'fhe majority holding 
that Exchange subseribers are entitled to no reimbursement 
from Company after the of the last yearly policy 
issued which 
the law has 
to from his own wrong. 
Company-Attorney stood in a rt>lation to Exchange 
CaL,\pp.2d 5J9 P.2d 677]) and should therefore 
be held to the same standards as the law imposes on the 
trustee of an express trust (117 Cal.App.2d 519 f256 P.2d 
677] ). (See also Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 CaLApp. 462. 466 [99 
P. 549] ; Edgar v. Bank of America, 50 Ca!.App.2d 827, 833 
[123 P.2d 885] ; 'l'he Fiduciary Principle, 37 C.L.R. 539-555.) 
It is an elementary principle of tht> law of trusts that a trustee 
is forbidden to make use of the trust property for his private 
or individual purposes or to derive any profit therefrom (Civ. 
Code, § 2229; Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 529 [163 P. 
893] ; Hest., Trusts, § 205 (b) ; Crenshaw v. Roy C. 8eeley Co., 
129 Cal.App. 627 [ 19 P.2d 50) ; 25 CaLJur., § 190, p. 342) 
and if he does derive profit from such a breach of trust he is 
liable to the beneficiary therefor (Estate of Piercy, 168 Cal. 
755 [145 P. 91]; Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, 639 [66 P. 12, 
85 Arn.St.Hep. 233] ; 1'obin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 CaL 247 
[ 267 P. 694] ; 2 Scott on Trusts, § 170.2, p. 1199 ; Rest., Trusts, 
§ 205 (b) ; Civ. Code, § 2237). The policy of the law has always 
been, up until this case, to put fiduciaries beyond the reaeh 
of temptation by making it unprofitable for them to yield to it. 
(Maclsnac v. Pozzo, 81 Cal.App.2d 278, 285 [183 P.2d 910]; 
111·iller v. McKinnon, 20 Ca1.2d 83 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 
570]; Hoyt v. Harnpe, 206 Iowa 206 [214 N.W. 718, 724] .) 
The breach of the fiduciary duty in the case at bar has proved 
very profitable to Company and a majority of this court has 
placed its stamp of approval thereon. 
The rule which sho1tld be applied here is that stated in the 
Restatement of Restitution, section 160, Comment (d): "There 
are some situations, however, in which a constructive trust is 
imposed in favor of a plaintiff who has not suffered a loss 
or who has not suffered a loss as great as the benefit received 
by the defendant. In theile situations the defendant is com-
pelled to surrender the benefit on the ground that he would be 
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, even 
Oct. hmUS'l'RIAL lNDEM. Co. GoLDEN STATE Co. 299 
f 49 C.2d 255: 316 P.2d 966] 
that enrichment is not at the expense of the 
if the defendant has made a through the violation 
to the to whom he is in a fiduciary relation, 
to surrender the profit to the plaintiff, 
was not made at the expeme of the plain-
tiff." eases from California* which are in 
accord with the Restatement rule set forth must, under 
be deemed overruled. The 
in totally the the law of the 
ease, and the far-reaching effects its ill-advised decision will 
have on one of California's major industries, does not even 
discuss the law of restitution, and trusts, but holdB, simply 
and without amplification, that the evidence supports the find-
! One would never know from reading the majority opin-
ion that any law was involved; one would never know the 
of the theft committed as the result of the unlawful 
conduct of the officers of Company which is here judicially 
sanctioned. 
Speci<Jl Snrplus P·und 
In order that the attorneys and the people of this state who 
are interested in the purchase of insurance may understand 
just exactly what took place in this ease, I will set forth the 
facts relating to the second major issue involved here. 
Tlw undisputed evidence in the record shows that under 
the old undenvriters' agreements which were the original 
agreements between Exchange and Attorney, the Special Sur-
plus Fund was a fund set aside from premiums on policies 
issued by Exchange and was intended to be used for the 
expenses of liquidation in the event Exehange was ever liqui-
dated by Attorney in accordance with the terms of thr original 
agreements. There is no dispute that such liquidation has 
never taken place or was even contemplated, as the undisputed 
evidence shows that Company took over all assets of Exchange 
as a going bnsiness and that the Special Surplus Fund was one 
of the items which Company set up as an asset of Exchange for 
which Company agreed to pay the subscribers of Exchange 
the sum of $1,045,159.71. How the trial court determined that 
"Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634 [ 66 P. 12, 85 Am.St.Rop. 233] ; Tobin 
Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 Cal. 24'i [267 P. 694]; Weiner v. M1tllaney, 
59 Cal.App.2d 620 [140 P.2d 704]; Edgar v. Bank of America, 102 Cal. 
App.2d 700 [228 P.2ct 21]; Lantz v. StTibling, 130 Cal.App.2d 476 [279 
P.2d 112]; and see also Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Co., 322 U.S. 408, 417 
[64 S.Ct. 1075, 88 hEd. 1356]; MagTuder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 120 
[35 S.Ct. 77, 59 L.Ed. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 588·589 
[ 41 S.Ct. 200, 65 L.Ed. 
0.2d 
take-over 
'r.•n~cmn is entitled 
to this fund. 'l'he relied on is marvelous example of 
utter confusion. l"irst it is said: ''. . . the trial court found 
that the Fund was, under the Underwriters 
for expenses incurred in connee-
to ; that on No-
to Company as compensa-
connection with the 
less such as required to reim-
burse Attorney for future costs of ; and that the 
subscribers have no or claim to this si.nee it was 
not a part of 's business or assets." (Emphasis 
added.) quoted the of the superseded 
underwriters' agreements, the majority then states: "Under 
the Underwriters Attorney-in-Fact was entitled to 
this fund 'if discontinues business,' as compensa-
tion for up the affairs and liquidation. The question 
then arises whether has been 'discontinued.' The 
trial eourt found that it and the evidence supports the 
finding." It should be horne in mind that this 
Special Fund was derived from investrn,ent income 
of Exchange. It shcmk! also remembered that the member-
ship of and was identical. It should also 
he remembered that the District Court of Appeal specifically 
and unequivocally held that was not in liquidation. 
Under the the discontinuance of 
business by ma,chinations of Com-
pany must be 
Relying on the 
the 
tMore of this later. 
waived its 
fund. When the facts are understood it becomes apparent 
that waiver of its rights to the fnnd is the 
his money from his right to his 
do2s not make clear 
ag·reement dedared the District 
Court of Appral to be void and of no t>ffect e~tn be relied on 
in support of a of the eourt. The majority, 
in an effort to its holding, quo'es, out of context, a 
statement made the District Court of in its opinion 
on the :fir;:;t appeal (117 519, 537 P.2d 677]) 
that "The Company did not at an~· time in the operation of 
its business use any facilities or information belonging 
or secured through, the In tlJe District 
Court was to the situation as it was to the 
take-over of Exchange when engaged in 
compensation insurance in with Ex-
change. 
The majority, involved to Company, 
goes along with that it was entitled to 
the Special Surplus Fund under the old underwriters' agree-
ments which, it were reinstated the holding of 
the District Court of that the Transfer and Assump-
tion Agreement was invalid and void. The underwriters' 
agreements that should use the fund 
in the event of the discontinuance of business by 
The result to be reached so far as the Special 
Surplus Fund is concerned shonld be, since was 
illegally sold to and since it is now too late to set 
aside the illegal that the subscribers of should 
be compensated as as for that which they have 
INDUSTRIAL INDEM. v. GoLDEN STATE Co. C.2d 
lost which includes this fund which constituted their invest-
ment It stands to reason that had the illegal sale 
not taken place, the Surplus Fund would have re-
mained intact. agrees, although under the circum-
stances its is a magnanimous one, that Company 
should be reimbursed for its actual expenses in winding up 
the affairs of But aside from that agreement. 
Exchange is most entitled to the 
Fund. v. A_rt.el, 40 
P.2d 380]; Nat. Bank & Trust 
269 85 ILEd. 820] 
Attorney-in-Fact Fees 
This is another major issue involved which the majority 
opinion glosses over, and again the facts relating thereto will 
be set forth. 
Prior to the execution of the Agreement and under the old 
underwriters' agre.ernents Attorney was entitled to retain 25 
per cent of the premium deposits and 5 per cent of dividends 
as its fee. In consideration of this fee, Attorney was required 
to pay for all offices, equipment and personnel used for the 
business of Exchange. Subsequent to January 1, 1949, when 
the illegal AgTeement became effective, Company admits that 
it handled this business for its own account. The evidence 
shows that Company had, at the time of retrial, collected 
$78,419.13 as fees on dividends and the sum of $246,331.94 
as fees on premiums on the business di.rectly traceable to for-
mer Exchange subscribers. Just how, or why, Exchange 
should be charged with the fees provided for by the old under-
writers' agreements after the effective date of the illegal Agree-
ment remains a mystery. After the effective date of the illegal 
Agreement by Company's own admission it was acting on its 
own accmmt and there was no Attorney in existence. Ex~ 
change's recovery should be lessened only by the amount of the 
actual costs incurred by Company in conducting the business 
directly traceable to former Exchange subscribers. To hold 
otherwise permits Company to profit by its own wrongdoing. 
There can be no question but that the old underwriters' 
agreements were superseded by the illegal Agreement; there 
can also be no question but that the old underwriters' agree-
ments were not revitalized by the District Court of Appeal's 
holding that the Transfer and Assumption Agreement was 
illegal, void and of no effect. Company by its conduct after 
the assumption of Exchange business demonstrated that it 
was not acting under the old underwriters' agreements. (See 
INDUSTRIAL INDEM. Co. v. Gor,nEN STATE Co. 303 
f 49 C.2d 255; 316 P.2d 006] 
recwn;>u~·vmwtu Water etc. Co. v. Consolidated Ga.~ etc. Co. 
4, , 186 F.2d 934, and Virginia Dare Transp. Co. v. 
Norfolk Southen1 Bus 4, 1949], 176 F.2d 354, 
for cases holding that a judicial declaration of the invalidity 
of a later contract does not revitalize an original valid con-
tract.) 
The to the fees paid 
are commented on as follows by the 
''The evidence supporting the foregoing findings 
the Underwriters Agreement; (b) the Transfer and 
; and the agreement whereby 
Company assumed the obligations of Attorney and Attorney 
assigned its rights to the management fees." This statement is 
particularly interesting when it is remembered (1) that the 
Underwriters' Agreement was superseded by the Transfer and 
Assumption Agreement which was held to be illegal, void and 
of no effect, and ( 3) that the "agreement" between Attorney 
and Company was an agreement made by one legal entity with 
itself. I cannot conceive of a majority of this court sanction-
ing the use of a void and illegal contract as evidence in a case 
which arose ont of that particular void contract. But by its 
holding here a majority of this court not only judicially sanc-
tions an obvious wrong, hut, in effect, allows the wrongdoer 
to retain both the fruits of his wrong, a bonus for his wrong-
doing, and his expenses incident thereto! 
Conclusions 
We have this case before us because of the holding of the 
District Court of Appeal (117 Cal.App.2d 519) that the 
Agreement was illegal, void and of no effect because it was 
in violation of section 1101 of the Insurance Code. Section 
1106 of the same code makes any violation of section 1101 a 
misdemeanor. The District Court of Appeal held that the 
Agreement, since it was made contrary to the terms of a law 
designed for the protection of the public and which prescribed 
a penalty for its violation, was illegal, void and of no effect. 
There can be no question but that the same rule of law 
should be applied here as this court, speaking through Mr. 
,Justice Shenk, appliPi! i:1 t1: 0 e~1"e of Contmctor's etc. Assn. v. 
California Comp. Ins. Co .. 48 Cie1.2d 71, 76 [307 P.2d 626], 
and which was a unanimous derision. It was there held: "Ac-
ceptance or receipt of an unlawful rebate is a misdemeanor. 
Code, § 752.) Violation of the minimum rating law is also 
a misdemeanor. (Ins. Code, § 11742,) This court said in 
304 
a to 
contract founded upon is void." 
foregoing rule to the facts of the case at we have a situa-
tion where means of a contract an object 
prohibited by a law" the and assets 
of Exchange. That contract was and void because the 
act of into it constituted a crime. Such being the 
case the subscribers of should have the right to 
recover of value which Company under 
such illegal and void contract together with the increment 
thereof. 
The judgment in this case in the interest of justice, 
be reversed with directions to the trial court which cannot 
be misunderstood. Such directions should encompass all the 
issues raised and should be for an accounting to determine: 
1. The net profits made by from business directly 
traceable to former business. The trial court should 
retain jurisdiction so that the net profits accruing from year 
to year which are directly traceable to Exchange business may 
be judicially ascertained and awarded to Exchange sub-
scribers; 
2. The Special Surplus Fund comprising the investment 
earnings of Exchange prior to its illegal take-over by Com-
pany and amounting at the time of trial to the sum of 
$711,769.68 should be awarded to Exchange subscribers to-
gether with the increment thereof. 
3. The Attorney-in-Fact fees, amounting to the sum of 
$324,751.07, at the time of should be awarded to Ex-
change subscribers. The direction to the trial court to ascer-
tain the net attributable to business would 
its actual expenses in conducting the business 
traceable to former subscribers. 
I agree that the or refusal to award, interest 
on unliquidated amounts is a matter generally held to be 
305 
Ins. & Trust Oo. v. 
Wheeler v. Bolton. 92 
122 Cal.App.2d 
Inc. v. Palermo, 121 
may not participate 
except as <OOunsel for 
consent or the court may 
,Johnson's were fully 
counsel for the main stockholders (Mann v. 
53 280 [127 P.2d 970] ). 
For the reasons heretofore set forth it should be clear to 
every person that the should be reversed 
with dear directions to the trial court for its guidance on the 
retrial. 
The of defendants and appellants for a rehearing 
was denied November 1957. Gibson. C .• ]., Cart"'r .• L. and 
Traynor, were of the that the petition should be 
granted. 
A. No. 24622. In Bank. Nov. 1, 1957.] 
lm liECCA RILEY, as etc., Petitioner, v. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUN'rY, 
Respondent; NAOMI BLAIR RUOl!'F et al., Real Parties 
in Interest. 
Courts-Jurisdiction-Scope and Extent.--Where a tribunal 
has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, the juris-
diction continues until a final judgment is entered. 
[2] Appeal-Remittitur-Effect of Issuance.-After a remittitur 
has been issued by order of the appellate court and has gone 
down in accordance with Code Civ. Proc., § 958, the juris-
diction of the appellate court over the action is then revested in 
the trial court. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, § 90; Am.Jur., Courts, § 159 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, and Error, § 673. 
McK. Dig. References: "'tourts, § 22; [2] Appeal and Error, 
§ 1730; [3, 8] Guardian and Ward,§ 102; [4] Guardian and Ward, 
§ 49; [5] Guardian and § 100; [6] Trusts, § 358; (7] 
Guardian and Ward, § 97; Guardian and Ward, § 97. 
